




ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS NOT SO 
IMPOSSIBLE AND CONDORCET’S PARADOX IS NOT SO 
PARADOXICAL: THE ADEQUATE DEFINITION OF A 






In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the 
known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and 
that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a 
social welfare function. This means that Arrow’s impossibility theorem is simply a 
consequence of forcing the individual utility functions to be ordinal. And second, based on 
this proof, this article establishes two necessary conditions for the adequate definition of a 
social choice problem. It is shown that, if these two conditions are satisfied, a number of 
desirable properties for a social choice are satisfied, including transitivity. This means that 
Condorcet’s paradox is simply the result of a social choice problem that is not well defined. 
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En este artículo hacemos dos cosas. En primer lugar, presentamos una prueba alternativa, 
simplificada, del ya bien conocido hecho de que funciones cardinales de utilidad individual 
son necesarias, pero no suficientes, y de que la comparabilidad interpersonal es suficiente, 
pero no necesaria, para la construcción de una función de bienestar social. Esto significa 
que el teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow es simplemente una consecuencia de forzar 
que las funciones de utilidad individual sean ordinales. En segundo lugar, basados en esta 
prueba, establecemos dos condiciones necesarias para la adecuada definición de un 
problema de escogencia social. Se muestra que, si esas dos condiciones se satisfacen, un 
número de propiedades deseables para una escogencia social se satisfacen, incluida la 
transitividad. Esto implica que la paradoja de Condorcet es simplemente el resultado de un 
problema de escogencia social que no está bien definido. 
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 1 Introduction
This paper deals with the pairwise independence condition, or condition of independence
of irrelevant alternatives (in the sense of Arrow). For short, we will call it the condition I.
Reaching a proper undertanding of condition I is important because it plays a prominent
role in at least two places. The ﬁrst one is the famous Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Condition I is in fact one of the axioms that Arrow [2, 1950], [3, 1951] argues cannot be
simultaneously satisﬁed by a social welfare function. The second one is the proof that
the social welfare functional P : UI → P is equivalent to the preference relation % if
and only if a set of conditions is satisﬁed, one of them being condition I.1
In fact, Mas–Colell, Whinston and Green [16, 1995, sec. 22.D] show that, for a pair
of options s1,s2 ∈ S, where S is a set of social options,
s1 P(u1,...,uI) s2 ⇔ (u1(s1),...,uI(s1)) % (u1(s2),...,uI(s2))
if and only if three conditions are satisﬁed:
1. There are at least three alternatives.
2. The social welfare functional P : UI → P is Paretian.
3. The social welfare functional P : UI → P satisﬁes the pairwise independence
condition.
This is, from a social welfare function w : S → RI → R such that w = w(u1(s),...,-
uI(s)), a social welfare functional can always be generated,2 but, to derive from the
social welfare functional a social preference relation deﬁned on proﬁles u1(s),...,uI(s)
of utility values, the three previous conditions are required. The key condition is the
third one, the pairwise independence condition.
Condition I can be understood in two senses: (1) applying to ordinal utility functions
only, as Arrow intended (strict sense), or (2) applying to cardinal utility functions (loose
sense). It can be understood that condition I in its loose sense is a distortion of what
Arrow intended to do (which was to force the individual utility functions to be ordinal);
however, it shall be proﬁtable to consider condition I in its loose sense as well.
We shall argue that, when condition I is understood in its strict sense, then it leads
directly to Arrow’s result. In other words, condition I in its strict sense is suﬃcient
1 Notationally, P = P(u1,...,uI) is a preference relation; UI is the set of all possible utility functions
for a given set of I individuals; P is the set of all possible preference relations; ui : S → R is the utility
function of individual i, i = 1,2,...,I; and S is a set of social options such that S = s1,...,sS. We
will use the conventions that ui denotes a function, while ui(s) denotes a value of the function, and
that the symbols P or % without subindexes refer to social preferences; with subindexes, to individual
preferences.
2 Simply by letting P(u1,...,uI) be the preference relation in S induced by the welfare function
w(s) = w(u1(s),...,uI(s)).
1to obtain the impossibility theorem: Arrow’s theorem holds because it imposes an in-
trinsically inconsistent condition, in the sense of imposing a condition that cannot be
satisﬁed.
Then it is worth undertanding condition I in a loose sense. In this case, condition I
can also be interpreted in two senses. In a sense, is trivial. In another sense, it imposes
a strong restriction of the form of the social welfare function w.
Once condition I is properly understood, then a set of conditions that are necessary
for an adequate deﬁnition of a social choice problem are naturally derived. It can be
then shown that some voting paradoxes, like the famous paradox of Condorcet, can be
explained, not as particular instances or examples of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, but
as violations of the conditions to be determined. In others words, paradoxes like the
paradox of Condorcet exist because the social choice problem to which they apply is not
well deﬁned.
We also show that, if the set of conditions that are necessary for an adequate deﬁ-
nition of a social choice problem are satisﬁed, then the social choice problem satisﬁes a
number of desirable properties.
This article has ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst one is this introduction. In the second one
condition I is discussed. It is shown that the construction of social welfare functions
requires cardinal individual utility functions. In the third section, some conditions for
the adecuate deﬁnition of a social choice problem are established, and are used to show
that a well deﬁned social choice problem implies that social choice is transitive. This
means that Condorcet’s paradox is the result of a social choice problem that is not well
deﬁned. In the fourth section, the conditions for the adequate deﬁnition of a social
choice problem are used to derive other properties that are satisﬁed by a well deﬁned
social choice problem. The ﬁfth section concludes.
2 What does condition I say?
Condition I has been described in the literature in several ways (see Sen [21, 1986, p.
1077]). The form in which Arrow [3, 1963, p. 27] described it (which shall be called
Arrow’s version) is the following:
Condition (Arrow’s version of condition I). Let P1,...,PI and P 0
1,...,P 0
I be two
sets of individual orderings, and let C(S) and C0(S) be the corresponding social choice
functions. Then,
1. if s1 Pi s2 ⇔ s1 P 0
i s2 for all i and all pairs s1,s2 ∈ S,
2. then C(S) and C0(S) are the same, and the social choice function C(S) satisﬁes
the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
2It must be noticed that Arrow’s version of condition I has two parts. Part 1 considers
two individual orderings for each individual i, Pi and P 0
i, and it imposes the requirement
that, for any two options s1,s2 ∈ S, s1 Pi s2 if, and only if, s1 P 0
i s2.
Part 2 of condition I says that, if part 1 is satisﬁed, then, for the two sets of individual
orderings P1,...,PI and P 0
1,...,P 0
I, the corresponding functions of social choice C(S)
and C0(S) must be the same. In other words, C(S) and C0(S) must have the same
elements.
However, the most common form in the literature (which shall be called the common
version of condition I) is the following (see, for example, Inman [14, 1987, p. 683]):
Condition (Common version of condition I). The selection of either of two alter-
natives by the social choice process must depend on the individual’s orderings over only
those two alternatives, and not on individual orderings over other alternatives.
It shall be seen later that these two alternatives are not entirely equivalent.
It is also convenient to review two textbook versions of condition I (see Mas–Colell,
Whinston and Green [16, 1995, defs. 21.C.3 and 22.D.3]):
Condition (Textbook 1 version condition I). The social welfare functional P :
A → P satisﬁes the pairwise independence condition
1. if s1 %i s2 ⇔ s1 %0
i s2 for all i and for any pair of alternatives s1,s2,
2. then s1 P(%1,...,%I) s2 ⇔ s1 P(%0
1,...,%0
I) s2.
Condition (Textbook 2 version of condition I). The social welfare functional P :
UI → P satisﬁes the pairwise independence condition
1. if ui(s1) = u0
i(s1) and ui(s2) = u0
i(s2) for all i and for any pair of alternatives
s1,s2,
2. then s1 P(u1,...,uI) s2 ⇔ s1 P(u0
1,...,u0
I) s2.
From the previous versions of condition I, it can be seen that it is not the norm to
express both individual and social preferences in terms of individual and social utility
functions u and w, respectively. However, as this paper shall demonstrate, we believe
that it is highly proﬁtable to do so, so here we propose our own version of condition I:
Condition (Our version of condition I). The social welfare function w : S → RI →
R satisﬁes the pairwise independence condition
1. if
(a) ui(s1) = u0
i(s1) and ui(s2) = u0
i(s2) or
(b) ui(s1) ≥ ui(s2) ⇔ u0
i(s1) ≥ u0
i(s2) for all i, all pairs of options s1,s2 ∈ S and
any transformation τ such that u0
i = τui.
32. then
(a) argmaxs w(u1(s),...,uI(s)) = argmaxs w(u0
1(s),...,u0
I(s)) or
(b) w(C(S)) = w(C0(S)), or, more precisely, if s∗ ∈ C(S) and s0∗ ∈ C0(S), then
w(s∗) = w(s0∗) or
(c) In general,
i. w(u1(s),...,uI(s)) = w(u0
1(s),...,u0
I(s)) or






The statement 2.(c) is a generalization of 2.(b). The statement 2.(a) is a set equiv-
alence; the statements 2.(b) and 2.(c) are a value (real number) comparison. The
generalization 2.(c).i is an obvious one to make: it simply requires that w = w(s) be a
function of the set S.
2.1 Transformations




i of the preferences of the individuals, be they described by preference relations Pi
or %i, or by utility functions ui. It is then key to have a taxonomy of the transformations,
in order to understand what transformations are valid and what are not. For this
purpose, consider the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Ordinality). A function ui : S → R satisﬁes the ordinality condition if
and only if for all pairs of options s1,s2 ∈ S,u(s1) ≥ u(s2) ⇔ s1 % s2. A utility function
that only satisﬁes the ordinality condition is unique only up to a positive monotonic
transformation.
If a function ui respects the ordinality condition, then it assigns numbers to the op-
tions in a way that respects the ordering of options generated by individual preferences.
The ordinality condition is the minimum necessary condition for a utility function to be
an adequate representation of individual preferences. It is well known that, if preferences
are complete and transitive, then the construction of a utility function that satisﬁes the
ordinality condition is always possible.
Deﬁnition 2 (Ordinally consistent transformation). For a preference relation Pi
or %i, a transformation P 0
i = τPi or %0
i = τ %i is ordinally consistent if, for all pairs
s1,s2 ∈ S, it happens that s1 Pi s2 ⇔ s1 P 0
i s2 or that s1 %i s2 ⇔ s1 %0
i s2. For
a utility function ui, a set of transformations u0
i(s) = τsui(s) is ordinally consistent
if, for all pairs s1,s2 ∈ S, it happens that ui(s1) ≥ ui(s2) ⇔ u0
i(s1) ≥ u0
i(s2). If
a transformation does not satisfy this condition, then it shall be named an ordinally
inconsistent transformation.
4A cardinality condition can be added to the ordinality condition, so as to deﬁne an
intrapersonal intensity of preferences:
Deﬁnition 3 (Cardinality). A function ui : S → R satisﬁes the cardinality condition
if and only if it is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation. This means that, if ui
is a function that satisﬁes the cardinality condition, then u0
i = τui describes the same
utility function, where τ is a positive aﬃne transformation such that τ(·) = a + b(·),
where a and b are two constants such that a,b ∈ R and b > 0. Any transformation with
b > 0 implies a change of units. Any transformation with a 6= 0 implies a change of
origin. A cardinal utility function has the property that, for any pair s1,s2 ∈ S, the
intervals ui(s1)−ui(s2) and u0
i(s1)−u0
i(s2) are equal up to the change of units. If a = 0,
then τ is a positive linearly homogeneous transformation, and it will be said that the
utility function that satisﬁes it is a cardinal function with ratios to scale. A cardinal
utility function with ratios to scale has the properties that (1) the intervals ui(s1)−ui(s2)
and u0
i(s1) − u0
i(s2) are equal up to the change of units, and (2) the ratios ui(s1)/ui(s2)
and u0
i(s1)/u0
i(s2) are equal. Since τ is monotonic, a cardinal utility function satisﬁes
the ordinality condition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Cardinally consistent transformation). For a utility function ui, a
transformation u0
i = τui is cardinally consistent if it satisﬁes the cardinality condition.
This implies that, for the individual i, u0
i(s) = τui(s) ∀ s. If a transformation does not
satisfy this condition, then it shall be named a cardinally inconsistent transformation.
Finally, one can add a condition of interpersonal comparability (or comparability for
short) to the cardinality condition, to deﬁne a base for interpersonal utility comparisons.
The condition of comparability has been stated in the literature as follows (see, for
example, Sen [21, 1986, p. 1.113]):
Deﬁnition 5 (Common version of comparability). Cardinal full comparability oc-
curs when, if there is a set of transformed individual utility functions τ1u1,...,τIuI,
then it happens that, for all i, τi(·) = τ(·), and τ is a positive, aﬃne transformation,
such that τ(·) = a + b(·), with b > 0. Cardinal non–comparability occurs when, if there
is a set of transformed individual utility functions τ1u1,...,τIuI, then it happens that
there is no common transformation τi = τ. In this sense, cardinal full comparability
requires that all the utility functions undergo the same transformation.
Another possible deﬁnition of comparability, not common in the literature, is the
following:




i, such that p,q
are two diﬀerent “scales of measurement” involving diﬀerent units and origins,3 satisfy
the comparability condition if and only if:
3 For example, degrees Celsius and degrees Fahrenheit in the case of temperature.
5• Both satisfy the cardinality condition.
• There is a unique way to cardinally transform the utility function u
p
i to express it
in terms of the scales of measurement (units and origins) of the utility function
u
q
i. This means that the transformation τpq = apq + bpqu
p
i, where τpq is the trans-
formation from the scale of measurement p to the scale of measurement q, is only
possible for a unique pair of parameters apq,bpq such that bpq > 0.
Notice that this implies that, if a certain scale of measurement is adopted as ref-
erence for a set of cardinal individual utility functions u1,...,uI, all the cardinal
individual utility functions are uniquely deﬁned in terms of that scale of measure-
ment. This also implies that, once all the utility functions are expressed in terms
of the scale of measurement of reference, if the scale of measurement of one in-
dividual changes, it is necessary to change the scale of measurement of all other
individuals as well in order to retain comparability.
Deﬁnition 7 (Comparably consistent transformation). For a set of individual
utility functions u1,...,uI, a transformation u0
i = τui for all i is comparably consistent
if τ is a positive aﬃne transformation and is the same transformation for all i and for
all s. This is, u0
i(s) = τui(s) ∀ i,s. Thus, it satisﬁes the comparability condition. If
a transformation does not satisfy this condition, then it shall be named a comparably
inconsistent transformation.
Two comments arise from these deﬁnitions. The ﬁrst is that we are restricting our-
selves to talk about cardinal full comparability. However, for certain types of compara-
bility, cardinality is not required. For example, Sen [21, 1986] considers the possibility
of ordinal level comparability.
The second is that our version of comparability is not conventional in the literature.
However, it complements the common version of the comparability condition. The
common version assumes that all the individual utilities are already measured in the
same scale of measurement (units and origins). The deﬁnition in our sense, however,
admits that it is not always the case that all the individual utility functions are measured
in the same scale of measurement. Comparability does not require that. It simply
requires that the transformation from one scale of measurement to another be unique.
For example, a comparison between two temperatures, one measured in degrees Celsius
and other measured in degrees Fahrenheit, is possible because there is a unique way
to transform degrees Celsius into degrees Fahrenheit: F = (9/5)C + 32. However,
once interpersonal comparison is established (there is certainty that all the scales of
measurement are the same), if one changes the scale of measurement of one individual,
both comparability conditions require that, to maintain comparability, all the individual
utilities must undergo the same transformation.
Based on the previous deﬁnitions, it is possible to see that Arrow’s version of condi-
tion I has two properties that the other versions of condition I do not fully have: (1) the
6versions of condition I diﬀerent from Arrow’s may admit inconsistent transformations of
the individual preferences (and are frequently interpreted in this sense), and (2) Arrow
is requiring that the only admissible transformations be ordinal, not cardinal: Arrow’s
version forces the individual preferences to be ordinal, while the other versions do not.
The key requisite is that Arrow forces the condition s1 Pi s2 ⇔ s1 P 0
i s2 to apply to all
i and all pairs s1,s2 ∈ S, while it has been commonly understood to apply to one pair
s1,s2 ∈ S. As we shall see below, the diﬀerence is very important.
In the following subsection we devote some brief comments to the question of incon-
sistent transformations. In the next section, we will study the logical consequences of
assuming that individual preferences must be ordinal only, as Arrow does, or cardinal,
as some people might allow by freely interpreting condition I.
2.2 Inconsistent transformations
An ordinally inconsistent transformation transforms an ordinal individual utility func-
tion into a diﬀerent one. It can be easily shown that the versions diﬀerent from Arrow’s
of condition I may allow ordinally inconsistent transformations: consider some initial
preferences of an individual i over a set S = s1,s2,s3, given by s1 i s2 i s3, that
are then transformed in the following way: s3 i s1 i s2. In both cases s1 i s2
(which respects part 1 of condition I for s1 and s2), but it is clear that these are
two diﬀerent orderings for individual i. The same can happen if the preferences of
the individual are expressed in terms of utility functions. Assume the initial prefer-




i(s3) = 4, which respects the condition ui(s1) = u0
i(s1) and
ui(s2) = u0
i(s2), but again the individual has a very diﬀerent ordering. It can also be
easily shown that the textbook 2 version of condition I may allow cardinally inconsistent
transformations: every ordinally inconsistent transformation is cardinally inconsistent
as well. The fact that many versions of condition I allow inconsistent transformations
is a very undesirable property.
2.3 Ordinality or cardinality?
It is important to appreciate that Arrow’s version of condition I implies that the in-
dividual utility functions must be ordinal and cannot satisfy the cardinality condition,
for if the individuals have two sets of individual preferences but both give the same or-
dering of options, the social choices made with each of these sets must be equal. Thus,
Arrow’s version of condition I imposes the requirement that the two sets of individual
preferences be ordinally the same. In brief, Arrow’s version of condition I restricts the
individual utility functions to be ordinal only.
However, no such conclusion follows from the other versions of condition I. Those
versions require that the individual utility functions, at least evaluated at the options
7s1,s2, be the same. But it is not at all obvious that they are restricted to apply to ordinal
functions only. In a word, these versions do not restrict the individual utility functions
to be ordinal. This raises an interesting question: what are the logical consequences of
condition I under either ordinal or cardinal utility functions?
2.3.1 Ordinality
Consider ﬁrst the case where the individual utility functions are ordinal only. In this
case, the following theorem demonstrates that no social welfare function w deﬁned over
ordinal individual utility functions can satisfy condition I, and in particular its part
2.(c). Thus, condition I imposes a requirement that is intrinsically inconsistent, since
no social welfare function can satisfy it.
Theorem 1. No social welfare function w : S → RI → R such that w = w(u1(s),...,-
uI(s)) can satisfy condition I. If a set of individual utility functions u1,...,uI only
satisﬁes the ordinality condition, then a social welfare function w based on this set
cannot be constructed. The minimum informational requirement on the set of utility
functions that is necessary, but not suﬃcient, to construct a social welfare function is
that they be cardinal. It is suﬃcient, but not necessary, that they be comparable.
Proof. The general structure of the social utility function w for a society of I individuals
is given by w = w(u1(s),...,uI(s)). This is a function whose domain is a set U, where
U is the set of all possible individual utilities evaluated at each possible social option s.4
Let S be the set of options s, s = s1,s2,...,sS over which the utility functions ui for
every i are deﬁned. Then the values ui(s) ∈ R are obtained from utility functions ui such
that ui : S → R (ui = ui(s)). Then an element of U is a vector u(s) = u1(s),...,uI(s).
Then, w can be rewritten as a function w : S → RI → R such that w = w(u(s)). But
w can also be interpreted as a function w : S → R such that w = w(s). It must be
remembered that w, being a function such that w : S → R, can assign one and only
one value to each and every option s. This implies that, if w can be expressed both as
w = w(u(s)) or as w = w(s), then, for w to be a function, the vector u(s) must be
unique for each s.
Now, let us assume that the individual utility functions only satisfy the ordinality
condition. Then, for an ordering of the options s according to individual preferences, the
vector u(s) = u1(s),...,uI(s) is not uniquely deﬁned, because, given the deﬁnition of
ordinality, the set UI = {u1,...,uI} allows positive monotonic transformations. Thus,
for any s, w would not be uniquely deﬁned, and therefore it could not be a function.
The same occurs if the functions only satisfy the cardinality condition. In a fashion
similar to the previous discussion, it will happen that, for an ordering of options s ac-
cording to the preferences of each individual, the vector u(s) = u1(s),...,uI(s) is not




s1 5 7 2 14
s2 4 2 9 16
s3 3 1 3 15
Table 1: Utility functions
uniquely deﬁned, because the set UI = {u1,...,uI} allows positive aﬃne transforma-
tions. Thus, for any s, w would not be uniquely deﬁned, and therefore it could not be
a function.
One possibility for a vector u(s) = u1(s),...,uI(s) to be uniquely deﬁned over a
given set of options s according to the preferences of each individual is that our version
of the comparability condition be satisﬁed. In this case, if it is possible to choose a
standard scale of measurement for all the individuals, the vector u(s) = u1(s),...,uI(s)
will be uniquely deﬁned over the set of options s faced by the society, and thus, the
function w will also be uniquely deﬁned.
Since the comparability condition only applies over cardinal utility functions only,
cardinality is necessary, but not suﬃcient, to construct a social welfare function w.
To appreciate that comparability is suﬃcient, but not necessary, to construct a social
welfare function w, consider an option d ∈ S such that d = u1(d),...,uI(d) = d1,...,dI.
Suppose the vector d is taken as a point of reference. Then deﬁne a social welfare
function w = w(u1(s) − d1,...,uI(s) − dI) deﬁned over deviations from the point of
reference. Since cardinal utility functions are interval–preserving, the diﬀerences u1(s)−
d1,...,uI(s) − dI are uniquely deﬁned for cardinal utility functions. Thus, for any s, w
would be uniquely deﬁned, and therefore it could be a function.
Summarizing, cardinality is necessary to construct a social welfare function w, but
is not suﬃcient. Cardinality plus comparability, or cardinality plus a social welfare
function w deﬁned over diﬀerences from a reference point, are suﬃcient.
Example 2.1. Consider a simple example, with i = 1,2 and s = s1,s2,s3. Each
individual has two preference relations Pi and P 0
i. Assume that, for individual 1, s1 1
s2 1 s3. On the other hand, for individual 2, assume that s2 2 s3 2 s1. Two sets of
ordinal utility functions that describe the orderings for each individual are given in table
1.
According to condition I, one must conclude that w(u(s)) and w(u0(s)) are the same
welfare function. However, this cannot be established from the utility functions. To see
this, the utility functions shall be reinterpreted as voting functions (ui = vi) and it will
be assumed that the aggregation method simply adds all the individual votes up for each
option (w = wv = v1 + v2).5 Then, wv(v(s)) will yield s2  s1  s3, because:
wv(v(s2)) = wv(v1(s2),v2(s2)) = v1(s2) + v2(s2) = 13 (1)
5 More on the relationship between social welfare functions and voting methods in subsection 3.1.
9wv(v(s1)) = wv(v1(s1),v2(s1)) = v1(s1) + v2(s1) = 7 (2)
wv(v(s3)) = wv(v1(s3),v2(s3)) = v1(s1) + v2(s1) = 6 (3)






























2(s3) = 16 (6)
This indicates that, if the utility functions are ordinal, the social aggregation that results
from them is arbitrary and it is, thus, undeﬁned.
From the previous theorem and example, an important conclusion can be pointed
out: Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that there are no methods of aggregation of
individual preferences able to satisfy simultaneously ﬁve “desirable” axioms because one
of its axioms, condition I, is intrinsically inconsistent: there is no way of satisfying it
because there is no way of contructing a social welfare function based upon individual
utility functions that only respect the ordinality condition.
The previous theorem, interpreted as saying that cardinality is required for a social
welfare function, is already very well known in the literature.6 However, it is expected
that the simple proof presented here helps clariﬁcate a hotly contested discussion about
these issues. In particular, the previous theorem, interpreted as saying that (1) condition
I is intrinsically inconsistent, or that (2) condition I is a suﬃcient condition to obtain
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, is rather less conventional.
To end this discussion, notice that Nash’s [18, 1950] bargaining solution is an example
of a social welfare function that requires cardinality, but does not require comparability.
If (U,d) is the Nash bargaining problem, where U is the set of possibilities of individ-
ual utilities, and d is the disagreement point that occurs should the negotiations fail,
the Nash bargaining solution is the point F(U,d) characterized by the point u that
maximizes the so–called Nash product
N = (u1(s) − d1)(u2(s) − d2)
It is clear that the Nash product (the Nashean “‘social welfare function”) is deﬁned in
terms of diﬀerences from a reference point, and thus comparability is not required.
6 For example, Mueller [17, 2003, p. 566] writes: “The very generality of the ordinal utility function,
which makes it attractive for the analysis of individual decisions, makes it unsuitable for the analysis
of social decisions, where trade–oﬀs across individuals are envisaged. To make these trade–oﬀs [...], if
utility indexes are employed, these must be deﬁned in such a way as to make cardinal, interpersonal
comparisons possible” (emphasis in the original).
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It remains to consider the second case, where the individual utility functions are cardinal.
Then the textbook 2 or our own version of condition I mean that, if ui(s1) = u0
i(s1), then
ui(s) = u0
i(s) ∀ s, due to the deﬁnition of cardinality and the deﬁnition of a cardinally
consistent transformation.
Setting ui(s1) = u0
i(s1) ∀ i with cardinal utility functions is equivalent to setting a =
0 and b = 1 in the transformation u0
i(s) = a+bui(s) for all i. But, in eﬀect, this is forcing
the comparability condition, although in a very trivial way: all the transformations leave
the individual utility functions unchanged.
Since ui = u0
i, another meaning of this condition is that a cardinal transformation
other than u0
i = τui = ui of some of the individual utility functions should not be
allowed. The reason is that the transformation of some of the individual utility functions
violates the common version of the comparability condition.
Now, if ui(s) = u0
i(s) ∀ s, then it follows trivially that w(u1(s),...,uI(s)) =
w(u0
1(s),...,u0
I(s)). This can be interpreted as saying that w = w(s) is uniquely deﬁned
when the comparability condition is satisﬁed.
This raises the question of what happens if all the ui are equally transformed with the
same transformation τ = a+bui, where the values a,b are not restricted to be a = 0 and
b = 1 (the parameter b must always be such that b > 0). Obviously, in this case, there
is no presumption that part 2.(c).i of our version of condition I, w(u1(s),...,uI(s)) =
w(u0
1(s),...,u0
I(s)), is satisﬁed. Thus, it would be nice if it could be established that
w(u0
1(s),...,u0
I(s)) = w0(u1(s),...,uI(s)), this is, if w is homogeneous of degree one.
This is, in fact, the case, as shown by Roberts [19, 1980] (see also proposition 22.D.2 in
Mas–Colell, Whinston and Green [16, 1995]).
Summarizing, when condition I is restricted to apply to cardinal utility functions
only, it is either trivial or, under non–trivial transformations that respect the compa-
rability condition, forces the social welfare function w to be homogeneous of degree
one.
3 The transitivity result: explaining some voting
paradoxes
In this paper we want to show that an adequately deﬁned social choice problem satisﬁes
a number of desirable properties. The ﬁrst one is transitivity, in a sense to be explored
in this section. This section contains ﬁve subsections. In the ﬁrst, the parallel between
social choice and voting functions is explored. In the second, some conditions for the
adequate deﬁnition of a social choice problem are identiﬁed. In the third, the so called
voting paradox, or Condorcet’s Paradox, is presented. In the fourth, the voting paradox
is explained as a violation of the conditions identiﬁed in the second subsection. In the
11last subsection other “paradox” is explained. Some other properties satisﬁed by an
adequately deﬁned social choice problem are presented in section 4.
3.1 The problem of the construction of social welfare functions
and voting methods
In this subsection the relationship between the problems of constructing a social welfare
function and a voting method shall be introduced. The problems of deﬁning a social
welfare function and deﬁning a voting method are related. In fact, a voting method is
simply a practical method used to approximate the social welfare function. We can say
that deﬁning a social welfare function is a theoretical problem, and deﬁning a voting
method is a practical problem.
Constructing a social welfare function. To construct a social welfare function
there are at least three separate problems (see Sen [20, 1970, p. 118]): (1) the measura-
bility of individual welfare through a function ui for all i, (2) interpersonal comparability
of individual welfare, and (3) the form of the function w which speciﬁes a social wel-
fare function given individual utility functions and the comparability assumptions. The
problem of interpersonal comparability can conceptually be solved in the deﬁnition of
the utiliy functions ui (allowing the “scales of measurement” (units and origins) in which
the functions ui are measured to reﬂect the relative weights that society attributes to
the individuals) or in the deﬁnition of the form of w. In this case, a set of weights is
introduced into the explicit form of w to reﬂect the “importance” of each individual’s
utility within the social welfare function.
Deﬁning a voting method. In the pragmatic terms of daily life, a society tries to
approximate the form of the social welfare function by means of some voting system.7
When a voting method is deﬁned, three problems conceptually similar to those faced
when constructing a social welfare function need to be solved. One must deﬁne: (1) how
many votes each individual can assign to each option, (2) how many votes are available
to each individual, and (3) how the individual votes are going to be aggregated to reach
a collective decision. In the practical problem of deﬁning a voting method, certain social
conventions have made the aggregation problem simpler, because the functional form
usually adopted is the one of summation of the votes cast by the individuals. Also,
7 However, voting is not the only system of aggregation of individual preferences. Arrow [3, 1963, p.
1–2 and 34] quotes dictatorship, social and religious conventions, the market and Kaldor’s compensation
principle as other aggregation systems. However, one can look for conditions that imply that the
problem of deﬁning a method of aggregation of individual preferences will be a problem of choosing
some system, more or less stylized, of voting. Arrow [3, 1963, p. 27–28] believes that condition I has this
implication: “The condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that in a generalized
sense all methods of social choice are of the type of voting”.
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be the same (one example is the criterion “one man, one vote”). In this way, voting
methods, in general, vary only in the way in which they deﬁne how many votes each
individual can assign to each option.
Notationally, it will be said that the ﬁrst problem of deﬁning a social welfare function
consists of deﬁning a function ui for each individual i. To solve this problem (how to
measure ui for all i), we shall deal with the individual utility functions in an entirely
orthodox way, by means of cardinal utility functions. Some people may argue that the
orthodox theory of choice in economics is ordinal not cardinal, but this is true only under
certainty. Under uncertainty, the orthodox theory is the one proposed by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [22, 1944], that uses the so called von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility functions. These functions are cardinal.
On the other hand, the ﬁrst problem of deﬁning a voting method consists of deﬁning
a function vi for each i, where vi(s) denotes the votes cast by individual i in favor of
option s. One can call vi a voting function, very much like one calls ui a utility function.
The deﬁnition of the function vi is usually an arbitrary exercise. Human ingenuity has
produced many voting methods.
In relation to the third problem previously mentioned, aggregation, that in terms
of social welfare functions amounts to ﬁnd the explicit form of w, to cut short a long
story, we will only say that, up to now, there is no satisfactory answer to this theoretical
problem. On the other hand, the problem of aggregation in practical terms, when voting
methods are involved, is usually solved in a very simple way: adding up, for each option
s, the votes cast by all individuals.
Here we present an example of a voting system that seems very natural, because
it represents the individual orderings by means of natural numbers. It must be kept
in mind, however, that there obviously are potentially inﬁnite voting methods. The
method of voting we introduce below was originally used by Arrow as an example of a
violation of condition I, initiating, as we shall see later, a tradition of misinterpretations
of condition I.
Example 3.1. This example presents the voting method known as the Borda count (see
Borda [11, 1781]),8 deﬁned as follows: for each one of the S options s belonging to a set
of options S, each individual i casts a number of votes from 1 to S based on the rank of
8 Jean-Charles de Borda was an XVIII century commander in the French navy and one of France’s
most reknown experimental physicists. He was the inventor of the repeating circle, the scientiﬁc instru-
ment used to calculate the true length of the meter. The story is told in Alder [1, 2002]. Borda’s voting
method was quickly adopted by the Royal Academy of Sciences of France once the author presented
it to the Academy, but then the method was eﬀectively criticized by another member of the Academy,
who suggested that the method was susceptible of manipulation by means of insincere revelation of
preferences. The name of the critic was Napoleon Bonaparte, who was, in his own right, a good math-
ematician. Borda’s reply was: “mi method is intended only for honest men” (at least part of this story
is found in Black [10, 1958, p. 180]). Borda was purged, but not guillotined, by the French Revolution.
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option receives S votes, the second most preferred option receives S − 1 votes and so
forth until the least preferred option, that receives a vote.9 Thus, an individual i that
has the following preferences over three options (s = s1,s2,s3):
s1 1 s2 1 s3
deﬁnes a voting function over the domain of options in the following way:
s1 → v1(s1) = 3
s2 → v1(s2) = 2
s3 → v1(s3) = 1
For a social choice all the votes received by each of the options s from every individual
i are added up, and the option with the greatest number of votes is declared the socially
preferred.
3.2 Some conditions for the adequate deﬁnition of a social
choice problem
A necessary condition to adequately deﬁne a utility function ui or a voting function vi is
to deﬁne the domain of the function. In this sense, a well deﬁned social choice problem
requires that a set of options S be taken as given. This condition can be named as
(weak) condition 1.
Condition 1 (weak). The set S of options s, where s = s1,s2,...,sS, is given.
Based on condition 1, it can be said that, in general, two social choice problems are
diﬀerent when they are deﬁned over diﬀerent sets of options.
It is assumed that all the individuals i have preferences over the elements of S.
Due to theorem 1, we will assume that those preferences can be described by means of
cardinal utility functions. This leads to the following condition:
Condition 2 (weak). For each individual i, i = 1,...,I, a cardinal utility function ui
(or cardinal voting function vi) deﬁned over S is given.
Due to theorem 1, we know that cardinality is necessary, but not suﬃcient, to be able
to construct a social welfare function. Then the form of w can be restricted (to express
w in terms of utility diﬀerences), or a stronger form of condition 2 may be imposed.
In what follows we shall assume that no explicit restriction on the form of w has been
adopted, so the strong version of condition 2 would be required to construct a social
welfare function.
9 Sometimes the rank is inverted. This is, a value S is assigned to the least preferred option and a
value 1 to the most preferred option. In this case, obviously, the socially most preferred option is the
one that obtains the least number of votes.
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function ui (or cardinal voting function vi) deﬁned over S is given. This means that
each and every function ui (or vi) deﬁned over S is:
1. cardinal,
2. comparable with the rest of elements of the set u1,...,uI (or v1,...,vI), and,
therefore,
3. unique.
Since condition 2 forces the individual utility functions to be cardinal, it can be
interpreted as the negation of Arrow’s version of condition I. Based on condition 2, it
can be said that two social choice problems are diﬀerent, even if they are deﬁned over the
same set of options, if they deﬁne diﬀerent sets of individual utility functions over the
same set of of options. Any comparably inconsistent transformation of the individual
utility (voting) functions modiﬁes the social choice problem, and therefore its solution
should not be expected to remain invariant.
A question then arises: if two social choice problems are diﬀerent because they are
deﬁned over diﬀerent sets, what conditions are necessary to make a consistent compar-
ison of these two problems?
Borrowing some ideas from knowledge theory (see, for example, Binmore [7, 1992,
cap. 10]), it is worth introducing the notion of a reﬁnement.
Deﬁnition 8 (Reﬁnement and unitary reﬁnement). It will be said that a reﬁne-
ment R of a set of options S is any subset of S, diﬀerent from S and diﬀerent from the
empty set ∅. Let S be a natural number that describes the cardinality or dimension of
the set S (in this sense, S is not only the name of the set, but also its cardinality).10 The
set S and its dimension shall be denoted SS. It follows then that R and its dimension
can be denoted RR, where R is a natural number such that 2 ≤ R < S. Lastly, let SS be
any set of social options. Then, it shall be said that RS−1 is a unitary reﬁnement of S.
Under general circumstances, for there to be a choice in some meaningful sense, it
is relevant to impose the condition that R has two or more elements, to avoid a trivial
social choice problem. In the two options case, then, the set R2 is equal to a social
choice between two options.
Therefore, condition 2 has an important interpretation.
Condition 2 (Interpretation). Given condition 1, that is, given a set S, condition 2
can be interpreted as saying that, for every option s such that s ∈ R,S, where R is a
reﬁnement of S, the value ui(s) (or vi(s)) for all i is equal, whether evaluated on S or
on R.
10 Obviously, the term “cardinality” here is used in a diﬀerent sense from that used in subsection
2.1.
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that, if satisﬁed, allows the consistent comparison of two diﬀerent social choice problems,
despite being deﬁned over diﬀerent sets of options.
Condition (of consistent comparability). Two problems of social choice deﬁned
over diﬀerent sets R,S such that R ⊂ S are consistently comparable if, ﬁrst, the set of
options R is a reﬁnement of the set S, and, second, the values of the utility (or voting)
functions are equal when evaluated over the set S or over the reﬁnement R of S.
It can be seen that, if conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, then the condition of consistent
comparability is also satisﬁed. The satisfaction of this condition is necessary to avoid the
comparison of diﬀerent social choice problems, or, colloquially, to avoid the comparison
of pears and apples in social choice.
3.3 The voting paradox as a particular case of Arrow’s theorem
It has been frequently stated that Arrow’s theorem is a generalization of the so called
voting paradox or Condorcet’s paradox, by its discoverer (see Condorcet [12, 1785]).11
Condorcet’s paradox shall be illustrated with the following simple example:
Example 3.2. Assume there are three individuals, 1,2,3, and three social options, s1,s2
and s3. The preferences of the three individuals are the following:
s1 ≺1 s2 ≺1 s3
s2 ≺2 s3 ≺2 s1
s3 ≺3 s1 ≺3 s2
By convention, individuals decide by majority voting between pairs of options. In
each pair, individuals are supposed to cast one vote for their most preferred option and
no votes for their least preferred option. According to this institutional setup, social
choice between s1 and s2 yields s1 ≺ s2, because
wv(v(s1)) = v1(s1) + v2(s1) + v3(s1)
= 0 + 1 + 0
= 1
11 The marquis Marie–Jean–Antoine–Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet was an XVIII century french
philosopher, deeply optimistic about the possibilities of human progress. He was permanent secretary
of the French Academy of Sciences during the Old Regime. He gave enthusiastic support to the decimal
metric system, to which, as was reviewed before, Borda’s work was key. Condorcet was a great admirer
of the American Revolution and a great enthusiast of the French Revolution. However, he ended up
persecuted by Robespierre and placed under arrest. He died in jail under unclear circumstances. He
probably committed suicide to avoid the guillotine.
16and
wv(v(s2)) = v1(s2) + v2(s2) + v3(s2)
= 1 + 0 + 1
= 2
Thus, wv(v(s1)) < wv(v(s2)) ⇔ s1 ≺ s2.




















= 1 + 0 + 0
= 1
Thus, wv(v0(s3)) < wv(v0(s1)) ⇔ s3 ≺ s1.




















= 1 + 1 + 0
= 2
Thus, wv(v00(s2)) < wv(v00(s3)) ⇔ s2 ≺ s3.
Thus, communal preferences decided by majority voting between pairs of options yield
an intransitive result, s3 ≺ s1 ≺ s2 ≺ s3. Thus, Condorcet’s paradox arises.
3.4 Explaining the voting paradox
It is usually considered that the Condorcet paradox occurs simply because it is “another
example” of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. But here we want to show that, to explain
this paradox, it is not necessary to appeal to Arrow’s theorem. With the conditions 1
and 2 previously derived, it is now easy to explain the paradox of Condorcet presented







Table 2: Voting functions
Result 1 (Transitivity). If a social choice problem satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2, then
social choice is transitive.
Proof. By condition 1, take a given set S of options. By condition 2, for each option
s ∈ S, the set v1(s),...,vI(s) is given. Thus, wv(s) = wv(v1(s),...,vI(s)) is given.
Due to the interpretation of condition 2, wv(s) is given in R and in S. Then, for any
three options s1,s2,s3 ∈ S, the values wv(s1),wv(s2),wv(s3) are given. Assume that
wv(s1) ≥ wv(s2) ≥ wv(s3). Then s1 % s2 % s3. Additionally, wv(s1) ≥ wv(s3) implies
s1 % s3. Then social choice cannot be intransitive.
Result 1 says that, if conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, then social choice is transitive.
But Condorcet’s paradox is a case of intransitivity in social choice. Then, by result 1,
Condorcet’s paradox should be explained by the violation of conditions 1 and 2. This is,
indeed, the case. Consider the set of preferences of individual 1 in example 3.2 (a similar
analysis could be made for individuals 2 and 3). The “true” preferences of individual
1 are s1 ≺1 s2 ≺1 s3. However, his preferences, as revealed by the voting process, are
given in table 2. It is clear that the preferences revealed by the voting process are
anomalous in two senses: ﬁrst, while v1(s1) = v0
1(s1) and v0
1(s3) = v00
1(s3), it occurs that
v1(s2) 6= v00
1(s2). Thus, there has been a transformation that is not cardinally consistent.
Second, voting does not reproduce the “true” individual ordering, because, according to
the votes cast, s3 ∼1 s2 1 s1 or s3 1 s2 ∼1 s1, while the true individual preferences are
s3 1 s2 1 s1. Thus, there has been a transformation that is not ordinally consistent.
All of this violates condition 2.
These violations produce Condorcet’s paradox. To see this, consider example 3.2
“correctly” analyzed, as follows.
Example 3.3. Refer to example 3.2 to analize it “correctly”. To do this, ﬁrst take
the set S = {s1,s2,s3} as given (condition 1). Then, for each individual, a voting
function deﬁned over S must be taken as given for the problem (condition 2). Assume
the preferences of the individuals, translated into voting functions, are given in table
3. It can be seen that the voting functions of the three individuals are described by the
Borda count.
Now, comparisons by pairs can be done without problems. One key aspect to remem-
ber is that, according to the interpretation of condition 2, if s ∈ R,S, then vi(s) must
remain the same whether evaluated in R or S. Thus, if s1 is compared to s2, the result
18s v1(s) v2(s) v3(s)
s1 1 3 2
s2 2 1 3
s3 3 2 1





s1 1 3 2
s2 1.5 1 4
s3 2 2 1
Table 4: Voting functions
is s1 ∼ s2. If s1 is compared to s3, the result is s1 ∼ s3. And if s2 is compared to s3, the
result is s2 ∼ s3. The problem of intransitivity has disappeared, because s1 ∼ s2 ∼ s3.
Naturally, the speciﬁc result that society as a whole is indiﬀerent between these three
options is a consequence of the comparability assumption adopted, and can vary if an-
other comparability assumption is used. To see this, consider in table 4 a second set of
voting functions, which is more arbitrary, but the orderings of individual preferences are
still respected. With the second set of voting functions, if s1 is compared to s2, the result
is s2  s1. If s1 is compared to s3, the result is s1  s3. And if s2 is compared to s3, the
result is s2  s3. In this case, the intransitivity problem has also disappeared, because
s2  s1  s3, but the social ordering is very diﬀerent in the two cases. A similar thing
happens in example 2.1.
This example shows that, if the given set of cardinal utility functions u1,...,uI is not
restricted to be comparable, but conditions 1 and 2 (weak) are still satisﬁed, social choice
as implied by the function w would always be consistent or transitive. Comparability,
that ensures the uniqueness of the set u1,...,uI, is required to guarantee the uniqueness
of w as well. Thus, conditions 1 and 2 (weak) are suﬃcient to eliminate the paradox of
Condorcet, but conditions 1 and 2 (strong) are suﬃcient to guarantee the uniqueness
of w. Thus, cardinality of the set u1,...,uI is necessary to ensure the transitivity of w,
and comparability of the set u1,...,uI is necessary to guarantee that w is unique.
3.5 Explaining other “paradox”
It is usually argued, in a tradition initiated by Arrow [2, 1950] himself, that the method





s1 3 2 1 1
s2 2 1 3 2
s3 1 2
Table 5: Voting functions
Example 3.4. The following example is not identical to, but represents the spirit of,
the example originally presented by Arrow [2, 1950, p. 201]. Individuals 1 and 2 have
the following preference maps over a set S = {s1,s2,s3}:
s1 1 s2 1 s3
s2 2 s3 2 s1
Thus, using the Borda count, social aggregation over the three options set yields the
following result:
wv(s1) = v1(s1) + v2(s1) = 4
wv(s2) = v1(s2) + v2(s2) = 5
wv(s3) = v1(s3) + v2(s3) = 3
Using the Borda count over the three options set, the socially preferred option is s2.
Let us now assume that s1 is to be compared with s2. Condition I in its common
version interprets that to do this the comparison must only consider s1 and s2, and that
s3, the “irrelevant” alternative, must be ignored. In this case, social aggregation over a















Using the Borda count over the two options set, society is indiﬀerent between s1 and
s2.
In other words, when s1 is compared to s2, the comparison varies depending upon
the presence of s3. If s3 is considered, s2  s1. If s3 is not considered, s2 ∼ s1. This is
exactly what the common version of condition I prohibits. From this it is concluded that
the Borda count violates condition I.
However, consider the sets of preferences of individuals 1 and 2. Their preferences,
as revealed by the voting process, are given in table 5. It is clear that the preferences
revealed by the voting process are anomalous in the sense that, for individual 1, v1(s1) 6=
v0
1(s1) and v1(s2) 6= v0
1(s2). However, the anomaly with the transformation of the voting
function of the individual 1, which seems to be cardinally consistent, is not as serious
20as the anomaly with the transformation of the voting function of individual 2. For him,
v2(s1) = v0
2(s1) but v2(s2) 6= v0
2(s2). Thus, there has been a transformation that is not
cardinally consistent. All this violates condition 2. It is clear here that the interpretation
of condition 2, requiring that, if s ∈ R,S, then vi(s) must remain the same whether
evaluated in R or in S, is violated here. In general, vi(s) changes whether evaluated in
S = s1,s2,s3 or in R = s1,s2.
As stated before, it is not at all surprising that social orderings diﬀer when obtained
from (very) diﬀerent problems. However, it is important to understand why they diﬀer.
In the example 3.4 there is no unanimity in the social choice between s1 and s2. Indi-
vidual 1 prefers s1 1 s2, while individual 2 prefers s2 2 s1. A society cannot reach a
decision between these two options without the deﬁnition of some cardinality and com-
parability conditions, which is exactly what a voting method does. It is only natural
that, if the electoral system allows changes over those cardinality and comparability
conditions, social decisions may not be consistent.
4 Other formal implications of conditions 1 and 2
The fact that conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed has some interesting implications for social
choice. In section 3 it was seen that, if conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, then transitivity
in social choice is satisﬁed. This section shall explore some other conditions that are
also satisﬁed if conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed:
1. The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash [18,
1950].
2. The Condorcet’s condition.
3. The path-independence condition.
4. If the set of “conceivable” alternatives or options (the “universal” set) is known
and the utility or voting functions can be deﬁned over it, then the consistent
condition for the enlargement of S is also satisﬁed.
4.1 Condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the
sense of Nash
The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash [18, 1950],
that shall be named condition IN, is diﬀerent from Arrow’s condition I. Binmore [9,
1998] illustrates condition IN intuitively in the following way: suppose Adam and Eve
go to a chinese restaurant and are going to share a dish. In the menu there is chow
mein, chop suey, and egg foo yung. They choose chow mein. After choosing, the waiter
informs them that the restaurant has run out of egg foo yung. If Adam and Eve change
21their decision with this information, they are violating the condition IN. If they do
not change their decision, the egg foo yung plays the part of an irrelevant alternative
because, since it is not going to be chosen, it should not matter whether it is available
or not. Formally:
Deﬁnition 9 (Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash).
Let w∗(s) be deﬁned as the maximum of a social welfare function w evaluated over the
set S. This maximum shall be called the value of S. Let s∗ ∈ S be the argmaxw(s);
this is, w∗(s) = w(s∗). It must be noticed that s∗ may not be unique. It will then
be said that the condition of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash is satisﬁed if
s∗ ∈ R ⇒ w∗(R) = w∗(s) = w(s∗), where R is a reﬁnement of S.
Condition IN says that, if an option s∗ is optimal for a set S of options, then it must
be optimal for any reﬁnement R of S to which s∗ belongs. Obviously, in this case, the
irrelevant alternatives are all the options that are elements of the set complement of R,
{R, where {R is deﬁned by the conditions R ∪ {R = S, and R ∩ {R = ∅.
Result 2. If a social choice problem satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2, then social choice
satisﬁes the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash.
Proof. By condition 2, if s∗ ∈ R,S, then ui(s∗) (vi(s∗)) is given in R and S for all i.
Thus, w(s∗) is given for R and S, and w∗(R) = w∗(S) = w(s∗). Thus, the condition of
irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash is satisﬁed.
4.2 Condorcet’s condition
Condorcet’s [12, 1785] condition establishes that, for an alternative s ∈ S to be so-
cially considered the most preferred, it must defeat in pairwise comparisons all other
alternatives in S.
Deﬁnition 10 (Condorcet’s condition). Social choice satisﬁes Condorcet’s condition
if the set C(S) selected by the social choice function is deﬁned as follows: C(S) = {s∗ :
if s∗ ∈ S and ∀ s ∈ S,⇒ w(s∗) ≥ w(s)}.
Result 3. If the problem of social choice satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2, then social choice
satisﬁes Condorcet’s condition.
Proof. By condition 2, ui(s) (vi(s)) is given for all s ∈ S. Thus, v(s) is given for all
s. For any two options s1,s2 ∈ S, it must be true that w(s1) ≥ w(s2) or viceversa.
Thus, there must be at least one s∗ ∈ S such that w(s∗) ≥ w(s) for all s ∈ S. Thus,
Condorcet’s condition is satisﬁed.
224.3 Path independence condition
The path independence condition stipulates that the ﬁnal choice of a society over S must
be independent of the path of comparisons between options to be taken. To develop
the intuition of the idea, remember the deﬁnition of reﬁnement and unitary reﬁnement
given above. Consider, additionally, the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 11 (Inclusive, exhaustive and minimum exhaustive reﬁnement).
An inclusive reﬁnement IR of a set of options S is any reﬁnement R of S such that
some s∗ in S belong to the reﬁnement. In general, w∗(R) ≤ w∗(S), with strict equality
if, and only if, R is IR. If all s∗ in S belong to the reﬁnement, then IR is exhaustive
(ER). On the other hand, a minimum exhaustive reﬁnement MER of a set of options
S is a reﬁnement R∗ such that the elements of R∗ are all of the form s∗ in S. In other
words, w∗(S) = w∗(R∗) for all s∗ ∈ R∗,S.
It can be observed that the set R∗ coincides with the result of the social choice
function C(S). The set R∗ can have one or several elements. It is clear that the
complement of R∗ deﬁned over S, {R∗,12 is the subset of irrelevant alternatives in the
sense of Nash in the set S.
What happens when a reﬁnement R of the set S is made? If R can be treated
as an IR, the value of the social choice is not altered. Even more, if the discarded
option when going from S to R does not belong to R∗, it is irrelevant in the sense of
Nash. Now, if R cannot be treated as an IR, the fact that the preferred candidate
of society is not included in R diminishes the value of the social choice. In general,
w∗(S) = w∗(IR) > w∗(R).
It is interesting to think the opposite case, when an enlargement of a subset R ⊂ S
is made.
Deﬁnition 12 (Enlargement). An enlargement E of a set of options S is any set of
options diﬀerent from S such that S ⊂ E. For a set R ⊂ S, it will be said that an
enlargement E of R is consistently comparable if E ⊆ S, and thus condition 2 applies
to E. If the dimension of S is S, it will be said that the enlargement ES+1 is a unitary
enlargement of S.
What happens when an enlargement E of a set RR is made? Without loss of gener-
ality, let us suppose we are dealing with a unitary enlargement. Let the option added
to the set RR be sR+1. If the value of E is equal to the value of R, in such a way that
w∗(E) = w∗(R), the enlargement E of R to include option sR+1 does not add value to
the problem of social choice, and thus option sR+1 is irrelevant in the sense of Nash.13
Now, if w∗(E) > w∗(R), the option sR+1 adds value to the problem deﬁned on R, and
thus it must become the preferred option in the set E.
12 R∗ ∪ {R∗ = S, R∗ ∩ {R∗ = ∅.
13 It could be not that irrelevant if w(sR+1) = w∗(E) = w∗(R). In this case, sR+1 would be one
more element of the minimum exhaustive reﬁnement of E.
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is satisﬁed if, for any class of subsets Rk ⊂ S such that ∪kRk = S, the social choice
function satisﬁes C(∪kRk) = C(∪kC(Rk)) or w(∪kRk) = w(∪k{s∗
k}).
Result 4. If a social choice problem satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2, then social choice
satisﬁes the path independence condition.
Proof. Deﬁne any class of subsets Rk ⊂ S such that ∪kRk = S. Then it must be
true that, for at least a subset Rk, s∗ ∈ Rk. Then, it must be true that, for all Rk
such that s∗ ∈ Rk, s∗ ∈ {s∗
k}, where {s∗
k} = C(Rk) is the set of the most preferred
options in the subset Rk. Now, if s∗ ∈ {s∗
k}, then {s∗
k} ⊆ {s∗
k}, because it has to be
true that w(s∗) = w(s∗
k) for all s∗ ∈ {s∗
k}. Then, the set {s∗} = C(S) can be deﬁned
as {s∗} = ∪k{s∗
k} such that s∗ ∈ {s∗
k}. But this last equality can be rewritten as
C(∪kRk) = C(∪kC(Rk)).
4.4 The consistent comparability condition for the enlarge-
ment of S
In subsection 3.2 the necessary conditions for the consistent comparison of social choice
problems deﬁned over diﬀerent sets of options were discussed. It was initially said
that, in general, problems with diﬀerent sets of options are diﬀerent, and thus are not
comparable. However, it was stated that the correct interpretation of condition 2 implied
that there exists a particular case in which it is possible to make consistent comparisons
of social choice problems with diﬀerent sets of options: when there are two diﬀerent sets
R,S such that R ⊂ S.
It is important to make a distinction at this point. It will be said that the elements
of the set S are available or feasible options or alternatives. If an option of the set S is
not really available, S can be redeﬁned to transform it into a set S0 which is a unitary
reﬁnement of S, RS−1 (S0 = RS−1), where the non available option of S is excluded.
If an option is transformed from feasible to non feasible, a serious conceptual problem
does not arise, as long as the transformation can be treated as a reﬁnement of S.
Diﬃculties arise when the transformation is from a non feasible option to a feasible
one. Consider the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 14 (“Universal” set of options s). Let T be the set of all conceivable op-
tions, regardless of whether they are available or not. T is then the maximal conceivable
enlargement of S.
It could then be said that the distinction between T and S is that T is the set of
all conceivable options, regardless of whether they are available or not, and S is the
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be treated as a reﬁnement of T. This leads to the following condition.
Condition 3 (Strong). T is known.
If condition 1 (strong) is satisﬁed and condition 2 is satisﬁed over T, neither any
reﬁnement R of S nor any enlargement E of S would be problematic. In this case, any
deﬁnition of the set S can be treated as a reﬁnement of T.
Summarizing, the transformation of an option from admissible to non admissible,
for it to be non problematic, requires that condition 1 (weak) and 2 be satisﬁed. In this
case, the transformation always can be treated as a reﬁnement of the set of options S.
On the contrary, the transformation of an option from non admissible to admissible is
more demanding because, for it to be non problematic, requires that condition 1 (strong)
and 2 be satisﬁed.
5 Conclusions
In this article we show that, when social preferences are represented by means of a
social welfare function w : S → RI → R such that w = w(u1(s),...,uI(s)), based on
individual utility functions ui : S → R, i = 1,...,I, rather than on individual preference
relations, it is easy to prove that the construction of a social welfare function requires
cardinal individual utility functions. It is shown that cardinal utility functions are
necessary, but not suﬃcient, and that interpersonal comparability is suﬃcient, but not
necessary, for a social welfare function. This in turn implies that condition I of Arrow’s
impossibility theorem is internally inconsistent. This condition prohibits cardinality and,
thus, interpersonal comparisons, and it is thus directly responsible of the impossibility
result of Arrow’s theorem: given condition I, it is impossible to construct a social welfare
function. In consequence, this article takes sides with those who have criticized condition
I as excessively and unnecessarily severe. Arrow’s theorem is not so impossible, if one
is willing to work with cardinal utility functions.
Based on this result, an interpretation frequently attributed to Arrow’s impossibility
theorem can be questioned. It is often argued that what Arrow shows is that “social
coherence” or the “common good” are impossible. However, we believe that the correct
interpretation is much more limited, and was pointed out by Arrow [3, 1963, p. 59]
himself: “If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the
only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be sat-
isfactory and which will be deﬁned for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are
either imposed or dictatorial” (emphasis in the original).
14 Note that an eﬀort to diﬀerentiate between “irrelevant” and “inapplicable” alternatives is being
done. As previously noticed, the irrelevant alternatives, both in Arrow’s and Nash’s sense, belong to
S, while the inapplicable alternatives belong to T but not to S. This distinction is not rigorously done
in the literature and may lead to some misunderstandings.
25As another conclusion, this article postulates two conditions, called conditions 1 and
2, that are necessary to deﬁne a problem of social choice correctly. These conditions
are:
1. That the set of options over which social choice is made be given.
2. That the individual utilility (or voting) functions to be deﬁned over the set of
options be given.
It is shown that, if a problem of social choice satisﬁes these conditions, then a set of
desirable conditions for a social choice are satisﬁed:
1. The transitivity condition.
2. The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense of Nash.
3. The Condorcet’s condition.
4. The path independence condition.
5. The condition of consistent comparability of social choice problems with diﬀerent
sets of options.
This implies, in particular, that, if a social choice problem violates the transitivity
condition, as in Condorcet’s paradox, it must be because the social problem violates
conditions 1 and 2, and is therefore not properly deﬁned. Some other voting paradoxes
can be explained in the same way. In this sense, Condorcet’s paradox is not a “particular
case” of Arrow’s theorem or in any sense paradoxical: it is just a social choice problem
that is not well deﬁned.
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